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IS LAWFARE WORTH DEFINING? 
REPORT OF THE CLEVELAND EXPERTS MEETING 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2010
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 10–11, 2010, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law hosted a symposium and experts meeting on the question of 
what is ―lawfare‖ and how should the United States and its allies best re-
spond to it? The event was funded by the Wolf Family Foundation, orga-
nized by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, and co-sponsored 
by the American Society of International Law, the International Association 
of Penal Law (American National Section), International Law Association 
(American Branch), the Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excel-
lence, and the Public International Law and Policy Group. 
The Cleveland Experts Meeting was chaired by Elizabeth Andersen, 
the Executive Director of the American Society of International. Of the two 
dozen other participants in the Experts Meeting, several were current or 
former Judge Advocate General (JAG) lawyers (Gregory Noone, Sandy 
Hodgkinson, Michael Lebowitz, Charles Dunlap, Michael Newton, David 
Crane, and David Frakt). Additional participants were former government 
or international organization officials who had experience as practitioners in 
international criminal law and the law of armed conflict (David Scheffer, 
Justice James Ogoola, Robert Petit, William Schabas, Michael Scharf, Paul 
Williams, Orde Kittrie, Jamie Williamson, and Melissa Waters). The re-
maining participants consisted of leading academic experts on the law of 
armed conflict (William Aceves, Tania Ansah, Laurie Blank, Shannon 
French, Scott Horton, Jens Meierhenrich, Leila Nadya Sadat, Robert Strass-
feld, Susan Tiefenbrun, and Wouter Werner).1 The experts participated in 
their individual/personal capacities and not as representatives of their re-
spective countries, organizations, or institutions. 
The hope was that the Experts Meeting could develop one or more 
useful definitions of ―lawfare,‖ develop strategies to prevent the misuse of 
the term, and determine whether legal institutions were equipped to respond 
to ―lawfare.‖ 
 In accordance with the understanding of the participants, this report 
follows the ―Chatham House Rule‖; therefore, the views of particular ex-
  
 *  This Report was drafted by Michael Scharf & Elizabeth Andersen, assisted by Cox 
Center Fellows Effy Folberg, Michael Jacobson, & Katlyn Kraus. 
 1 A list of the experts and their affiliations follows as an Appendix to the Report. 
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perts remain unidentified in the text. In some places, the discussion has been 
re-ordered to enhance organizational clarity. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE TERM ―LAWFARE‖ 
The term ―lawfare‖ does not yet appear in the Oxford English Dic-
tionary. Prior to 2001, the term was used sporadically in a variety of con-
texts. The term was popularized that year in a speech at Harvard University 
by Major General Charles Dunlap, who defined it as ―a strategy of using—
or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an 
operational objective.‖2 As originally envisioned by Dunlap, ―lawfare‖ was 
a neutral term. It was designed as a sort of ―bumper sticker‖ to help military 
personnel understand why the law needs to be incorporated into their think-
ing and planning. 
In recent years, the term has been used by groups and commentators 
in an array of ways, many of which mean something quite different from 
Dunlap’s original conception. Today, ―lawfare‖ is used most commonly as a 
label to criticize those who use international law and legal proceedings to 
make claims against the state, especially in areas related to national security. 
This definition has been popularized by a neo-conservative-sponsored group 
called ―The Lawfare Project,‖3 whose website lists as examples of ―lawfare‖ 
the case brought to the International Court of Justice on the legality of 
Israel’s security barrier, human rights cases sponsored by organizations 
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and litigation in support of terrorist 
detainees.
4
 ―Lawfare‖ has also been used to describe the nefarious exploita-
  
 2 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L. AFF. 146, 146 
(2008). 
 3 The Lawfare Project is a New York-based organization devoted to exposing alleged 
abuses of the international legal system. About Us, THE LAWFARE PROJECT (last visited Dec. 
16, 2010), http://www.thelawfareproject.org/about. When references are made to the ―hijack-
ing‖ of the term, the Lawfare Project is usually the chief culprit. The Lawfare Project defines 
their goal as analyzing ―lawfare as it used (via the Western legal system), nationally and 
internationally, to: (1) Thwart and punish free speech about issues of national security and 
public concern, (2) De-legitimize the sovereignty of democratic states, and (3) Frustrate and 
hinder the ability of democracies to defend themselves against terrorism.‖ Id.  
The primary goals of the Lawfare Project are: (i) To raise awareness about the phenomenon 
(and specific instances) of lawfare assuring the subject matter receive the credibility and 
immediacy that it warrants, (ii) facilitate (legal and non-legal) responses to the perversion 
and misapplication of international & national human rights law, (iii) identify and mobilize 
human and institutional resources, and (iv) bring diverse and interested parties together in a 
common forum to discuss the threat.  
Id. 
 4 What is Lawfare?, THE LAWFARE PROJECT (last visited Dec. 16, 2010), http://www. 
thelawfareproject.org. 
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tion of international law for propaganda purposes by, for example, orches-
trating civilian deaths.5 
The assembled Experts recognized that, however defined, ―lawfare‖ 
is a potentially powerful term that reflects the importance of law in the con-
flicts of the twenty-first century.  
III.  HAS THE ACADEMY ALREADY LOST CONTROL OF THE CONCEPT OF 
LAWFARE? 
Two fundamental debates regarding the definition of ―lawfare‖ per-
vaded the expert discussion. The first was whether the term should be iden-
tified empirically—based on its usage up to the present—or normatively—
based on an agreed-upon more appropriate definition. The second debate 
was whether academicians and legal experts should use the term at all, not-
ing that using the term ―lawfare‖ itself potentially undermined respect for 
the rule of law. 
Some participants believed that ―lawfare,‖ if defined narrowly, 
could be a useful term, but as described in more detail below there was little 
consensus on how best to define the term. Most participants agreed, howev-
er, that the reactive, ―right-wing‖ concept of ―lawfare‖ constituted a ―hi-
jacking‖ of the term and should be rejected. Not everyone thought that such 
a rejection was possible, though, and some of the experts expressed the 
view that now that others have widely propagated an alternative definition 
of the term, the academy has lost the initiative and would be fighting a futile 
cause in trying to recapture the concept as a neutral term. 
While some of the experts wished to see ―lawfare‖ retain its utility 
as a useful label for legal and military professionals, others believed that 
regardless of the term’s usefulness in its original military context, it had lost 
its usefulness when it began to be applied more broadly. Explaining why 
―lawfare‖ should not become a field of academic inquiry, one participant 
stated that the military implications of the term were ―shocking in a civilian 
context.‖ 
Some participants took the very existence of an empirical-
normative debate to imply that the academy has already lost the initiative, 
and that ―lawfare‖ has morphed into and will remain a term describing per-
ceived wrongful uses of the law to achieve political or military ends. These 
experts opined that if a term encompassing the more ―positive‖ uses of 
―lawfare‖ were needed, a separate term should be crafted. There was not, 
however, unanimity on this point, with some arguing that alternate defini-
tions of ―lawfare‖ have already made headway in the arena of public debate. 
  
 5 Mark Martins, Reflections on “Lawfare” and Related Terms, The Lawfare Project 
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/reflections-on-%E2%80%9Clawfare 
%E2%80%9D-and-related-terms/. 
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They noted that while an Internet search in the spring of 2010 would likely 
have disclosed hundreds of references to the ―Lawfare Project‖ definition, 
in recent months alternative definitions have been gaining in exposure.6 
Some of the participants believed that regardless of what experts 
think about use of the term ―lawfare‖ and its various definitions, the term is 
already so widespread that it cannot be ―de-invented.‖ They opined that the 
term will likely remain in use, but it will not necessarily be limited to a sin-
gle definition. They pointed out that ―lawfare‖ is likely to join the ranks of 
the many terms in the dictionary that have alternative definitions. 
One participant warned that any attempt to develop a generally 
agreed upon definition of ―lawfare‖ would likely encounter problems simi-
lar to efforts to pin down an accepted definition of fundamental concepts in 
international humanitarian law (IHL), such as the term ―genocide,‖7 noting 
that certain problematic concepts within definitions can easily ―blow up in 
the face‖ of academics looking for a hard and fast definition. It was sug-
gested that if the goal was to use ―lawfare‖ to describe attempts by enemies 
to use the law of armed conflict to gain a strategic advantage over or con-
strain U.S. or allied military forces, the definition should be limited accor-
dingly. Another participant echoed this sentiment, noting that ―the term now 
has come to mean so much more than what it was originally supposed to,‖ 
thereby weakening its overall usefulness. 
Concern that the term has been ―hijacked‖ by neo-conservative in-
terests spurred one participant to argue that any attempt to ―reclaim and 
revalidate the proper exercise of the law‖ in the face of right-wing defini-
tions of ―lawfare‖ essentially plays into the hands of the ―hijackers.‖ The 
expert added that debating whether existing legal tools such as tribunals and 
international criminal indictments fit into ―lawfare‖ is not constructive. 
Such tools, it was argued, have existed for many years and whether they are 
used appropriately or not will ultimately depend on whether the legal insti-
tutions ―follow the law and the evidence.‖ 
  
 6 See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Jack Goldsmith, & Robert Chesney, LAWFARE: HARD 
NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICES, http://www.lawfareblog.com/. 
 7 The Genocide Convention defines genocide as ―any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,‖ 
including:  
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births with the group; (e) Forcibly transferring child-
ren of the group to another group.  
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. While the term ―genocide‖ has a narrow legal defini-
tion under the Genocide Convention, it tends to be accorded a broader definition in political 
and diplomatic discourse. 
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Another participant, arguing on similar lines, stated that any attempt 
to define ―lawfare‖ in such a way that academics could ―box it in‖ to a mili-
tary context would fail and would be contrary to the purpose of public inter-
national law. The value added by public international lawyers, it was ar-
gued, is the development of frameworks and parameters in which concepts 
such as ―lawfare‖ can be subject to broad analysis and scrutiny. 
Given the widespread disagreement on definition, some thought that 
―lawfare‖ may not be ―a particularly useful term‖ and may serve simply as 
―an invented phenomenon‖ useful only to anti-international humanitarian 
law ―hijackers‖ as a tool of intimidation. Others added that neo-conservative 
scholars had attempted to seize the concept of ―lawfare‖ as part of a broader 
effort to make a case for unrestrained action by the U.S. president in the 
―global war on terror.‖8 Such scholars argue that international law is neither 
―real law‖ nor a ―real constraint,‖ and that ―lawfare‖ was essentially an ille-
gitimate tactic used by foreign enemies to handicap the United States’ abili-
ty to fight terrorism. To refute that view, one of the participating experts had 
recently published a book based on interviews with former Department of 
State Legal Advisers, going back thirty years, which showed that interna-
tional law has, in fact, traditionally been viewed by policymakers as ―real‖ 
and as a legitimate constraint on actions that would contravene treaties and 
customary international law.9 
IV.  IMPORTANCE OF THE TARGET AUDIENCE 
In contrast to concerns about the hijacking of ―lawfare‖ by neo-
conservatives, one participant feared that imposing a definition would result 
in the term being ―hijacked‖ a second time—by the academy. Citing the 
importance of presenting a useful term to the relevant audience—―people 
making decisions and executing operations‖—it was argued that ―lawfare‖ 
could be likened to a weapon, with the normative value determined by use, 
not by definition. The suggested role of the academy, then, would be to de-
velop the ―intellectual infrastructure,‖ something the policymakers and op-
erators may not have the time to do themselves.10 
  
 8 See JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2005). 
 9 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010).  
 10 See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law and 
Associate Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Presented at Case Western 
University School of Law Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research 
Symposium, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia? (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.au. 
af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0520/0520Articles/Dunlap0520.pdf. 
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The utility of the ―lawfare‖ concept may therefore depend on how it 
is addressed to relevant audiences and in what legal framework it is ana-
lyzed. Participants focused mainly on broad questions and referred to IHL 
and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) interchangeably, with one defini-
tion suggested as the exploitation of IHL/LOAC ―to achieve tactical and 
strategic goals.‖ By using exploitation, rather than misuse, as the defining 
act, this definition focused on actors who evade the main requirements of 
IHL, for example, by placing weapons in civilian areas and not wearing 
uniforms. 
Not everyone felt that IHL and LOAC were freely interchangeable, 
noting that many in the military have no background or familiarity with the 
terminology used by lawyers with regard to IHL. In many cases, the target 
of the exploitation described above is not likely to be a public international 
lawyer, but rather a soldier or officer who has been exposed to a Clausewit-
zian approach that implies that the law of war is essentially irrelevant.11 It 
was suggested that for any practical impact to be made on military practi-
tioners, emphasis had to be placed on getting operators to understand the 
importance of the ―legal preparation of battlespace.‖  
It was pointed out that the military and the academy are not the only 
entities with an interest in ―lawfare,‖ and that it can serve U.S. interests as 
well as undermine them. Potential users of ―lawfare‖ can include many dif-
ferent government agencies and support for U.S. strategic objectives. One 
participant noted that the Treasury Department has made proactive use of 
―lawfare‖ strategies in deterring large corporations and banks from doing 
business with Iran, as a way to suppress Iran’s nuclear capabilities.12 
V.  DEFINING LAWFARE 
A. Use and Misuse of the Law 
Conference participants divided into two general groups in debating 
the appropriate definition of ―lawfare.‖ One group generally believed the 
definition of the term needs to include both the use and misuse of law to 
achieve operational objectives. Also discussed was whether ―lawfare‖ 
  
 11 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 13 (Wildside Press LLC 2009) (―Violence arms itself 
with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed 
restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of Interna-
tional Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power.‖). At least one participant 
noted that this is not to say that U.S. officers or enlisted service members subscribe to the 
view that the law of war is irrelevant. See, e.g., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS, THE 
MILITARY COMMANDER & THE LAW (AFJAGS Press 2009), available at http://milcom.jag.af. 
mil/ (providing general guidance in international law for commanders in the field as well as 
acting as a desktop book for instruction at various commander courses at Air University). 
 12 See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Dutch Bank Fined for Iran, Libya Transactions, THE WASH. 
POST, December 20, 2005, at D01.  
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should include uses of law and legal processes that ―complement,‖ as op-
posed to serve as a ―substitute‖ for, traditional military means to achieve an 
operational objective. Participating experts who preferred a definition of 
―lawfare‖ that includes both the positive and negative application of law 
described ―lawfare‖ as including not only activities undertaken by enemies 
of the United States, but also by the United States to accomplish national 
security objectives. 
By defining ―lawfare‖ to encompass both the use and misuse of 
law, participants sought to accomplish two objectives. First, a definition that 
includes the proper use of law as a substitute for military means encourages 
using law instead of military force. One expert noted that ―neither govern-
ment attorneys nor academics seem to spend much time thinking about the 
proactive use of law, how we can use law as a tool for accomplishing our 
policy objectives.‖ The expert said that the question we should really be 
asking is, ―what can be done by the executive branch and Congress to better 
use law as a proactive tool in promoting important national security objec-
tives?‖ Additionally some participants fear that only focusing on the misuse 
of law could negatively impact the view of international law. This led one 
expert to suggest that the academy should not worry about defining ―law-
fare,‖ but rather should critique those who attempt to use the term in fur-
therance of their anti-international law agenda. 
It was then suggested that a definition including the proper use of 
law would support a race to the courtroom instead of to the battlefield. For 
instance, one expert pointed out that private lawsuits against terrorist groups 
and states supporting terrorism ―have been extremely effective‖ and are 
―exceptional examples of the use of lawfare in the war against terrorism.‖13 
Further, a definition that acknowledges the proper use of law ―need not 
simply force the United States into a defensive crouch.‖ As one participant 
opined,  
if there are ways of accomplishing traditional military objective using U.S. 
law, the U.S. should not only fight back hard against others’ use of them 
but also vigorously look ourselves for a way to use the law. Truth be told, 
we have every reason to embrace lawfare, for it is vastly preferable to the 
bloody expense of indistinctive forms of warfare that ravaged the world in 
the twentieth century. 
It was pointed out in this regard that economic sanctions on Iran 
have been a ―particularly salient, deliberate, and in many ways a creative 
form of lawfare, using law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
  
 13 See Kirit Radia and Maddy Sauer, Pan Am 103 Families Finally Compensated, ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6158491&page=1 (describing 
the successful criminal prosecutions and civil damages obtained against defendants in the 
bombing of Pan Am 103, passenger airliner, in Lockerbie, Scotland). 
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achieve an operational objective.‖14 Some fourteen states have passed legis-
lation to divest their state’s pension fund from foreign companies doing 
business with Iran,15 and Treasury has convicted more than eighty banks, 
including most of the world’s top financial institutions, to cease some or all 
of their business with Iran.16 Other participants—who favored a purely neg-
ative definition of ―lawfare‖—questioned whether such actions should be 
considered ―lawfare.‖  
One expert warned that if the positive and negative applications of 
law are not both included in the definition of ―lawfare,‖ some groups or 
individuals would use the term to instill fear of international law in the 
American public. This could lead to the ―devaluation of the public’s image 
of international law.‖ The term ―lawfare‖ would ―become a code word for 
all things bad and mushy about international law.‖ 
Another expert suggested that the word ―misuse‖ should be re-
moved from the definition ―because misuse implies the objective or the mo-
tive of the person using it, saying that you can’t use law if you are a bad 
guy. And I don’t agree with that. I think bad guys can legitimately use law 
just like good guys can . . . . So I wouldn’t use the word misuse at all.‖  
B. Misuse of Law for Military Objectives 
The other main group of participants believed the definition of 
―lawfare‖ could only encompass the misuse or manipulation of law to 
achieve an operational objective; in other words, the exploitation of LOAC 
for strategic and tactical purposes. Many participants who believed ―law-
fare‖ is only the misuse of law look to how the term is used in popular dis-
course today for a definition. Most felt popular discourse used ―lawfare‖ as 
―an exploitation of the law‖ or ―wrongful manipulation of the law and legal 
system to achieve strategic military or political ends.‖17 They felt that ―even 
though the term may have been hijacked from its original meaning, the de-
finition should not be what the academy would like it to be, but rather how 
the term is actually being used.‖ Others suggested that having a term mean-
ing two competing and opposite things made no sense. ―So if the positive 
use of law needs its own term then we should come up with a different 
  
 14 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (imposing sanctions against Iran, North 
Korea, and Syria as a result of those countries’ unusual and extraordinary threat).  
 15 The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. 111-195, July 1, 2010, 124 Stat 1312 (outlining a standards for states and local govern-
ments to divest from and prevent investment in companies with investment in Iran’s energy 
industry).  
 16 See Sue Kirchhoff, Fed Imposes Fine of $100M on Swiss Bank, USA TODAY (May. 10, 
2004), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2004-05-10-fed-ubs-fine_x.htm. 
 17 See Brooke Goldstein Interviewed on Lawfare, THE LAWFARE PROJECT (Mar. 9. 2010), 
http://www.thelawfareproject.org/121/brooke-goldstein-interviewed-on-lawfare. 
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one.‖ Moreover, the experts in this group stressed that the definition of 
―lawfare‖ must be kept in a narrow context, ―otherwise, it gets out of con-
trol.‖  
Another suggested definition of ―lawfare‖ focusing on negative 
connotations was the ―manipulation or exploitation of the international legal 
system to supplement military and political objectives legally, politically, 
and through propaganda.‖ For instance, the Soviet Union had historically 
used ―lawfare‖ to ―control other states and to control the options of other 
states.‖ ―Propaganda is an exceptionally strong‖ use of ―lawfare,‖ and the 
Soviets ―were masters of it,‖ the expert added. Another expert pointed out 
that in recent years the Russian Federation has continued to use ―lawfare‖ 
by, for example, adding the definition of aggression into their criminal code, 
thus strategically preempting the [International Criminal Court (ICC)] by 
claiming Russia ―can try aggression on [its] soil‖18 ―This is not the legal 
application of international law, this is the preemption of international law,‖ 
the expert maintained.  
VI.  CATEGORIZING EXAMPLES OF LAWFARE 
A. Are Lawsuits and Legal Institutions a Form of Lawfare? 
The participating experts generally rejected the proposition that the 
legitimate application of the law of armed conflict or U.S. domestic laws 
should be considered ―lawfare.‖ Although Bush Administration officials 
had used the term ―lawfare‖ to derogatorily describe the legal work per-
formed by human rights organizations and pro bono lawyers,19 conference 
participants countered that the United States still needed to obey interna-
tional law in order to accomplish military objectives. One expert noted that 
it was the crimes at Abu-Ghraib (not the attempts to litigate those crimes) 
that were responsible for U.S. deaths, re-energizing the insurgency, and 
cutting off intelligence sources. The expert further argued that memories of 
violations of the law of armed conflict do not usually fade over time; rather, 
the story of violations tends to stay in the minds of those with whom the 
United States needs to cooperate and/or subdue in order to achieve opera-
tional objectives.20 Consequently, because respecting the law of armed con-
flict is necessary for U.S. operations to succeed, JAG lawyers must give 
  
 18 See Christi Scott Bartman, Lawfare: Use of the Definition of Lawfare By the Soviet and 
Russian Governments, (Aug. 2009), http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Bartman%20Christi 
%20Scott.pdf?bgsu1241726718. 
 19 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
5 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf. See Ash-
by Jones, Cully Stimson Resigns, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Feb. 24, 2007, 4:08 PM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/02/02/cully-stimson-resigns. 
 20 See Mark Bowden, The Professor of War, THE NEW YORKER, May, 2010, at 148. 
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legal advice to members of the armed forces so those persons know which 
actions they can and cannot take. 
Second, the participating experts tended to reject the proposition 
that alleged asymmetric use of international law against the United States 
demonstrates that obeying international law is contrary to the United States’ 
interests. One expert described the alleged asymmetric exploitation of law 
against the United States as ―lawfear,‖ which he defined as ―the creation of 
a specter of misuse of international law in order to cause the United States 
to fear international law.‖ Many of the participants believed the right-wing 
had politicized the definition of ―lawfare,‖ prompting one expert to suggest 
that ―lawfare‖ be defined as ―a term developed within the U.S. military and 
hijacked by right-wing ideologues in order to discredit the use of interna-
tional law by people with whom they disagree.‖ 
Participants were also generally dismissive of the fears of trumped-
up charges of war crimes against U.S. personnel. Instead, many of the par-
ticipants felt that the United States should not shrink back because of the 
fear of lawsuits regarding U.S. military operations. It was noted that we 
should have confidence in our judicial institutions to weed out illegitimate 
claims or the misuse of law. The common view was that the United States 
should welcome the lawsuits because these lawsuits would decrease the 
violence of international conflict, and would allow the United States to pur-
sue similar lawsuits against its enemies for their alleged violations of the 
law of armed conflict. Under this view, ―if stronger international legal insti-
tutions cause militants to rush to court instead of rushing to war, then inter-
national law is successfully mitigating the violence and bloodshed of war.‖ 
Additionally, the experts noted that victims of the United States’ 
enemies have had a string of successes in the courtroom and that such law-
suits are likely to increase in the future. It was suggested that victims of 
state-sponsored terrorism may start using tort law more ambitiously to hold 
state sponsors of terrorism liable for their conduct. For instance, an expert 
explained that there currently exists an INTERPOL arrest warrant for the 
sitting Iranian defense minister for the bombing of a Jewish Cultural Center 
in Argentina.21 Although the INTERPOL warrant has not resulted in any 
further action, the expert suggested that victims from the attack might con-
sider private litigation against the defense minister.  
B. The Legitimate Application of the Laws of Armed Conflict 
The experts agreed that the legitimate application of international 
law against participants in an armed conflict should not be labeled ―law-
fare.‖ Yet they were unable to agree on a definition of ―legitimate applica-
  
 21 Iran „Minister‟ on Interpol List, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/821 
5293.stm (last updated Aug. 21, 2009). 
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tion.‖ Many of the experts viewed the interpretation of the law of armed 
conflict as not constituting ―lawfare‖ unless the particular principle in ques-
tion is a ―contentious issue‖ or ―an underdeveloped area of law.‖ The most 
discussed contentious issues at the conference were the requirement of pro-
portionality and distinction,22 prohibited weapons under the Geneva Con-
ventions,23 and the definition of an armed conflict.24 
Experts analyzed the application of lawfare in distinction and pro-
portionality cases through the example of a minaret attack. The minaret 
attack begins with a combatant firing from within the minaret of a mosque 
at U.S. armed forces. Normally, a Mosque is a protected object as to which 
attacks are prohibited, but such objects lose their protected status if the 
enemy uses them as a base of military operations. The U.S. forces are then 
faced with the decision of whether to return fire. If the United States does 
return fire, cameras operated by hostile forces will videotape the encounter. 
Now armed with video evidence of U.S. troops firing at a religious building, 
these hostiles will then use the video as propaganda that the United States 
commits war crimes or even bring the videotape before a court as evidence 
of U.S. war crimes. This, one expert opined, was a case of illegitimate ap-
plication of international law, constituting ―lawfare.‖ One of the other ex-
perts noted that under this increasingly frequent scenario, the definition of 
distinction and proportionality is effectively replaced with a standard that 
says ―civilians died, therefore there were war crimes.‖ In such a situation, 
hostile parties can rely upon a result-orientated interpretation of the law in 
order to legitimize unlawful use of force or restrain a party of an armed con-
flict from exercising the lawful use of force. 
In this context, the participating experts noted a struggle to deter-
mine whether acts undertaken with intent to influence opinion and garner 
support among a target audience were acts of ―lawfare‖ or merely Informa-
  
 22 Experts used violations of the law of distinction to refer to violations of Articles 18 and 
37 of the First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention. Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 18 & 37, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 23 See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949 (Protocol I), 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June. 8, 1977 (Protocol II) art. 3, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, art.3, Aug. 12, 1949 (Protocol III), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949 (Protocol IV), 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June. 8, 1977 (Protocol II), art. 
1(1–2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (contrasting armed conflict with sporadic acts of 
violence and rioting). 
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tion Operations, a term widely known in military circles.25 With respect to 
the minaret scenario discussed above, some of the experts felt that this 
would be better labeled Information Operations than ―lawfare.‖ They 
opined that it would become ―lawfare‖ only if the party recording alleged 
violation of international humanitarian law took their claim before a judicial 
body or international institution.  
The experts further noted that certain ill-defined concepts might in-
vite ―lawfare.‖ Examples cited were the definition of ―armed conflict‖ under 
the Geneva Conventions and the definition of illegal weapons under Article 
36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. The status of vari-
ous violent situations as armed conflicts, such as the less than twenty-four 
hour African Union invasion of the Comoros Islands and fighting between 
Mexico and the drug cartels, is unclear. Consequently, the actors in those 
situations may either argue that the situation should be deemed armed con-
flict, and thus covered by the laws of war, or that the situation fails to reach 
the threshold and the country’s law enforcement regulations therefore go-
vern the use of force. Similarly, reviews of whether a particular weapon 
violates Article 36 can also be subjected to result-orientated interpretations 
of the law. One expert noted in this regard that the current push to classify 
white phosphorous as an illegal weapon26 is misplaced because in most cas-
es white phosphorous is lawfully used as a flare. 
Experts feared that the consequence of result-orientated interpreta-
tions of international humanitarian law is, depending on the interpretation, 
to relax or expand prohibitions on unlawful conduct to either allow or pro-
hibit any use of force during an armed conflict. Already, experts noted, mili-
tary commanders at times believe that every action they take could be ac-
cused of being a war crime. Consequently, members of the armed forces are 
forced to change or not engage in certain operations in response to an overly 
expansive interpretation of international humanitarian law prohibitions. 
Although several experts focused on interpretations of international law to 
―unnecessarily restrict‖ the lawful use of force, others voiced concern that 
governments are using new types of combat operations to argue that interna-
tional humanitarian law did not apply. 
However, despite recognizing that result-orientated interpretations 
of the law affect combat operations and weaken the law as an institution, 
experts were unable to reach consensus that interpreting and applying grey 
  
 25 Information Operations  broadly refers to the delivery and management of information 
affecting the battlefield while Information Warfare narrowly focuses on networks and com-
puter security. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, 
at I-1 (Oct. 9, 1998), available at http://www.c4i.org/jp3_13.pdf.  
 26 George Monbiot, Comment: Behind the Phosphorous Clouds are War Crimes Within 
War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/22 
/usa.iraq1.  
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areas of the law of armed conflict should be deemed ―lawfare.‖ For those 
experts that defined ―lawfare‖ as ―the exploitation of the law of armed con-
flict to achieve tactical and strategic goals,‖ the minaret scenario could be a 
form of lawfare. On the other hand, those who defined ―lawfare‖ as ―misuse 
of the law of armed conflict to achieve tactical and strategic goals,‖ were 
not so sure, because it is difficult to determine when someone is disinge-
nuously interpreting a law or interpreting the law in good faith. Although 
many expressed concern over improper interpretations of the law, experts 
were equally concerned how useful a definition of lawfare that included 
disingenuous interpretations would be if the experts could not reach a con-
sensus on how to distinguish an interpretation in good faith from an inter-
pretation in bad faith. 
VII.  ARE INSTITUTIONS EQUIPPED TO COUNTER USES OF ―LAWFARE?‖ 
Participants believed domestic institutions, at least inside the United 
States and other stable democracies, are capable of handling ―lawfare‖ in 
the form of trumped up charges of war crimes. In U.S. courts, several ex-
perts noted that judges are competent in evaluating the credibility of evi-
dence and have a variety of mechanisms—including the political question 
doctrine, the act of state doctrine, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, and the 
state secrets doctrine—to dismiss frivolous lawsuits. On the other hand, 
some experts viewed U.S. courts as too willing to dismiss legitimate law-
suits against the United States as evidenced by the 9th Circuit’s recent invo-
cation of the state secrets doctrine in the case of Mohamed v. Jeppsen Da-
taplan.27 
Several of the experts were less confident of the ICC, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and U.N. Human Rights bodies’ capabilities in res-
ponding appropriately to ―lawfare‖ because those institutions can suffer 
from politicization. The experts recognized that much of this is a problem of 
perceptions. Americans generally have a distrust of foreigners rendering 
judicial decisions against the United States. For instance, many in the Unit-
ed States oppose ICC ratification because doing so could involve foreigners 
deciding that the United States was unwilling to prosecute the crimes28 and 
thus subjecting U.S. soldiers to a foreign-run trial with the possibility of 
being sent to a foreign prison. Additionally, a few experts noted the creation 
of ad-hoc tribunals for certain conflicts and not others causes international 
criminal justice to appear politicized. Many in Lebanon, for instance, view 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon as a political rather than legal process 
because the number of victims in the situation before the Tribunal is sub-
  
 27 Mohamed v. Jeppsen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 28 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
File: Lawfare Report 2 Created on:  1/15/2011 2:41:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM 
24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:11 
stantially lower than in other situations for which such tribunals have not 
been established. 
One expert expressed concern that a finding that the law of armed 
conflict was violated could depend upon whether the prosecuting entity was 
a friendly ally, an enemy, or an international institution made up of a mix of 
judges from allied and unfriendly states. By way of example, the expert said 
he doubted whether French Resistance fighters against the Nazis tried in 
France after World War II would receive the same criticism that Palestini-
ans and Afghanis have recently received over their alleged violations of the 
law of distinction. 
Finally, several experts noted that non-state actors have fallen 
through the jurisdictions of most institutions. Non-state actors typically do 
not have their own judicial processes to prosecute members of their armed 
forces for violations of the laws of war. Additionally, domestic universal 
jurisdiction statutes often do not cover less severe war crimes such as dis-
carding a uniform to blend into civilian populations. Moreover, international 
institutions such as the ICC lack jurisdiction over many non-state violations, 
such as combatants mingling in the civilian population, because they are not 
grave enough to trigger ICC jurisdiction. Consequently, many non-state 
actor violations of the law of armed conflict are not currently prosecuted. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION: HOW TO RESPOND TO LAWFARE 
To the extent that this kind of lawfare involves the positive use of 
law and legal institutions to achieve strategic objectives without the use of 
military force, lawfare should be considered a positive development that 
complements the primary goals of IHL and LOAC—to minimize human 
suffering associated with armed conflict. This type of lawfare requires no 
response at all, and indeed should be encouraged.  But the more common 
use of lawfare in modern parlance has a distinctly negative connotation, 
suggesting abuse, misuse, and exploitation of the law. The experts disagreed 
on the extent to which lawfare, in this negative sense of the term, is a real 
phenomenon, with many expressing considerable skepticism that it is a sig-
nificant problem.  But, to the extent that lawfare is a real or emerging trend, 
the experts expressed great confidence in the ability of existing domestic 
and international legal institutions to respond appropriately to frivolous or 
abusive claims or other attempts to misuse the law to achieve military and 
strategic objectives. 
  The simplest and best way for democratic countries to safeguard 
themselves from the effective use of lawfare is to plan and conduct military 
operations in full compliance with the laws of war. Giving military JAGs a 
robust and proactive advisory role in the planning and execution of military 
operations will help to ensure that the law of armed conflict is respected. 
Thorough documentation of combat operations, including, where practica-
ble, videotaping, would also promote lawful behavior and assist in proving 
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or disproving allegations of misconduct. Prompt, aggressive and transparent 
investigation of all suspected or reported war crimes by any party to the 
conflict, coupled with vigorous efforts to hold transgressors accountable, 
will minimize the propaganda value of isolated law of war violations and 
help ensure that false accusations of war crimes do not gain traction. In 
short, those who respect and rigorously adhere to the law have little reason 
to fear that the law will be used as a weapon against them.  
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